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How Secularized is Germany? Cohort and 
Comparative Perspectives1
The author seeks to answer the question “How secularized is Germany?” on the 
basis o f  different perspectives and databases. The meaning o f  the term secular­
ization is limited fo r  this study to the decline o f  religiosity and its consequences, 
and a distinction is made between church-related and individual religiosity. 
First, evidence fo r  the decline o f  church-related religiosity in Germany is 
presented. N ext, it is shown that individual religiosity, i.e. religiosity not neces­
sarily related to organized religion, is also declining. Then the analysis is 
extended to investigate the relationship between religiosity and non-religious 
attitudes. Taking two illustrative examples, it is claimed that religion today is 
fa r  less salient fo r  the way we live and see the world than it has been in the 
past. Finally, the focus o f  the analysis is broadened to an international perspec­
tive in which Germany is compared with other countries. The author ends with 
some thoughts on the future o f  secularization in Germany.
Keywords: secularization • Germany • church • individual religiosity
L ’auteur cherche à répondre à la question: “Dans quelle mesure l ’Allemagne 
est-elle sécularisée?”, en se référant à différentes perspectives et bases de 
données. Après avoir délimité la signification du terme de sécularisation au 
déclin de la religiosité et à ses conséquences, une distinction entre la religiosité 
liée à l ’Eglise et la religiosité individuelle est opérée. Une première preuve du 
déclin de la religiosité liée à l ’Église en Allemagne est présentée. I l est ensuite 
démontré que la religiosité individuelle, c ’est-à-dire la religiosité qui n ’est pas 
nécessairement liée à m e  religion organisée, est aussi en déclin. L ’analyse est 
alors étendue, de manière à examiner la relation entre la religiosité et les atti­
tudes non religieuses. En prenant deux exemples illustratifs, il est affirmé que la 
religion d ’aujourd’hui est beaucoup moins saillante en ce qui concerne la 
manière dont nous vivons et voyons le monde qu’elle ne l ’était auparavant. Le 
sujet de l ’analyse est, enfin, élargi à une perspective internationale, dans laquelle 
l ’Allemagne est comparée à d ’autres pays. L ’auteur conclut avec quelques 
réflexions sur le fu tur de la sécularisation en Allemagne.
Mots-clés: sécularisation • Allemagne • Eglise • religiosité individuelle
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1 Introduction
This paper will attem pt to answer to the question “How secularized is 
Germany?” based on available empirical evidence. In order to do so it will 
first briefly explicate the meaning of the term secularization as used here, 
and characterize indicators of religiosity underlying the analysis. Then it 
will present empirical evidence for the extent to which the level of church- 
related religiosity has changed in Germany. Next the analysis turns to 
expressions of religiosity not necessarily related to organized religion. The 
relationship between church-related and individual religiosity in Germany 
is briefly explored. Then the analysis is extended to investigate the relation­
ship between religiosity and non-religious attitudes. Finally the focus of 
the analysis is broadened to an international perspective in which Germany 
is compared with other countries. The paper ends with a discussion of the 
future of secularization in Germany.
2 Conceptual Issues
Answering the question posed in the title implies a clear understanding of the 
term secularization. Here this term is taken to mean a decline o f individual 
religiosity and a decline o f the social consequences o f religiosity. In other 
words the analysis is confined to the level of individuals. That does not 
imply that either the significance of the organizational level of religion or 
the relationship between religion and state are disputed—for a broader 
definition see Bruce (2002: 3). A comprehensive analysis of secularization 
would have to critically investigate these fields too. This however cannot 
be accomplished here.
If secularization is defined as the decline of religiosity and its consequences 
then we have to measure these concepts. Within the European tradition, 
religion was equated with Christianity for a long time and Europe was 
referred to as Christendom (Davies, 1996: 7). Against this background it is 
understandable that most of the available indicators reflect Christian religi­
osity and church-related behaviour. While the prevalence of Christian and 
church-related indicators is adequate to describe the development of tradi­
tional religiosity, it is self-evident that they cannot capture other forms of 
religiosity or spirituality. If we trust newer observations on religious 
trends, it is these newer forms of religiosity and spirituality that are gaining 
importance and that are replacing traditional Christian religion (Davie, 2000; 
Heelas and Woodhead, 2005). Unfortunately, most large-scale quantitative 
datasets, especially if they cover a long time-span, lack indicators that 
would be needed for an analysis doing full justice to these claims. However, 
the various forms of “new” or “alternative” religiosity tend to be less orga­
nized and more individualized than traditional Christian religiosity. So if we 
draw on indicators capturing this quality we can test the importance of 
“new” religiosity at least to some extent. A t the same time this analysis 
can shed at least some light on an assumption that can be found in various 
theories of religion, i.e. the assumption that religion is universal either
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because it serves universal functions (Luckmann, 1991a) or because humans 
have a universal, constant need (or as the proponents of the supply-side 
theory of religion would say: “demand”) for religion (Stark and Bainbridge, 
1987).
In the following analysis, church-related religiosity is captured by church 
membership and church attendance, the two standard measures of Christian 
religiosity. Individual religiosity is measured by praying and subjective 
religiosity. These two indicators must be seen together with the two on 
church-related religiosity. Devout Christians should have high values, non­
religious people should have low values on both sets of indicators. The 
interesting question is, of course, how widespread is the combination of high 
levels of individual religiosity paired with low levels of traditional religiosity. 
This group, those who have turned away from church-based religion without 
giving up religiosity, should be of a notable size (Luckmann, 1991b; Davie, 
2000).2
The degree of secularization can be assessed against different criteria. One 
obvious criterion is the development of religiosity and its social impact over 
time. In order to carry out such inter-temporal analysis, time-series data 
reaching as far as possible into the past are needed. A slightly different 
perspective on the longitudinal change of religiosity is obtained when the 
development is analysed on the basis of birth cohorts. If  we compare older 
and younger cohorts, more about the character of the trend can be learned. 
Let us assume we observe a decline in religiosity. By applying cohort analysis 
we can find out if everybody is less and less religious, or if people’s religiosity 
is constant over their lifespan but each successive cohort is less religious 
than its predecessor -  a cohort effect. The central question here is how do 
younger cohorts compare to older ones with respect to the relevant indica­
tors. A  different way to approach answering the question posed in the title 
of this paper is to engage in international comparison. In this case we 
would ask how secular Germany is compared to other countries. Of course 
the answer may vary with the countries (and time points) we choose for 
this comparison. In the following section the central question of this paper 
will be addressed by means of different analyses relating to all of these 
perspectives.
3 Empirical findings
3.1 The development o f church-related religiosity in Germany
Let us begin with an analysis of church-related religiosity. In the year 1980 
almost 90 per cent of the population of West Germany belonged to either 
the Roman Catholic (47 per cent) or the Protestant Church of Germany 
(EKD: 42 per cent).3 By 1989—before East and West Germany were unified 
in 1990—this share had declined to 84 per cent. A t this point 27 per cent of 
East Germany’s population were Protestants and only 6 per cent Catholics. 
The vast majority of East Germans did not and still do not belong to a 
church or religious organization.
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FIGURE 1
Catholics and Protestants 1980-2005, as a percentage of the total population"
a Before 1990/91 only West Germany, since then unified Germany.
Data source: EKD 2006; Bischofskonferenz 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007.
In unified Germany in 1991 the proportion of members of the two main 
churches was around 72 per cent. This proportion steadily declined and 
reached 62 per cent in 2005 (Protestants and Catholics both approximately 
31 per cent). O f the remaining 38 per cent, around 4 per cent are Muslims,
3 per cent belong to other Christian organizations, 0.3 per cent are Buddhists, 
0.2 per cent are Jews, 0.1 per cent are Hindus and 0.2 per cent belong to other 
religious groups (REM ID, 2007). That leaves about 30 per cent of the popu­
lation (24 million) not belonging to any religious group.
Over the last 25 years more than 7.6 million people have left the Catholic 
and Protestant Churches. Although this must have been a bitter experience 
for the churches, this process could have been seen as positive if the remain­
ing members had become more committed. If we take church attendance as 
an indicator of commitment, however, this expectation is not met. On the 
contrary, attendance at regular Sunday services was already under 5 per 
cent among Protestants in 1980,4 and continued to decline during the next 
two and a half decades (see Figure 2). During this time the Catholic rate 
of church attendance almost halved: it dropped from 28 per cent in 1980 
to under 15 per cent in 2005. Thus, while more and more people have left 
the churches, the percentage of committed members among those who 
have not (yet) left has not increased but sharply decreased. The churches 
have not been able to turn the quantitative loss of members into a qualitative 
enhancement of their membership basis. Taken together, these findings clearly 
demonstrate a tremendous decline of traditional church-based religiosity in 
Germany.
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FIGURE 2
Attendance at regular Sunday services, 1980-2005, as a percentage of total membership
Data source: EKD 2006; Bischofskonferenz 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007.
The data presented so far were taken from official statistical reports of the 
religious bodies concerned. They give information about general develop­
ments, but do not give any insight into the social structure of the process 
of secularization. Because this is possible on the basis of survey data the 
following analyses are based on the General Social Survey of Germany, 
the ALLBUS. Figure 3 gives the proportion of adults in West and East 
Germany going to church very seldom or never for six different birth cohorts 
over the last 26 years. The demarcation of the birth cohorts corresponds with 
specific periods in German history.6
However, the different historical, political and economic periods do not 
seem to have had a lasting influence on the process of secularization. Instead 
each successive cohort shows a steady increase in the proportion not going to 
church.7 The analysis so far shows that traditional Christian religiosity is 
declining mostly because each new cohort is less religious than its pre­
decessors. N ot only has membership in the two dominant churches declined, 
but attendance at religious services has also dropped off sharply. With 
respect to traditional church-related religiosity, these analyses confirm what 
is known from many other studies about the development of religion in 
Germany. Some have interpreted these findings as conclusive evidence for 
secularization. Others have cautioned against premature conclusions, point­
ing to the possibility that church-related religiosity has been replaced by 
other forms of religiosity.
© 2008 Social Compass. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
116 Social Compass 55(2)












Attending church “never” or “seldom” by birth cohorts in West and East Germany, 1980-2006, as a
percentage of the cohort"
a Every point represents at least 100 individuals.
Data source: ALLBUS 1980-2006.
3.2 The development o f  religiosity beyond traditional churches
A decline of traditional church-related religiosity does not necessarily mean 
that people have given up religion altogether. Many have argued that people 
satisfy their need for religion by turning to other traditions, piecing together 
what they like. This phenomenon was dubbed religious bricolage (Dobble- 
laere, 1998; Luckmann, 1984: 105) or patchwork religiosity (Bleich, 2005). 
Thus it is assumed that while people turn their back on organised religion, 
they maintain a private religiosity and embrace “new” religions (Davie, 
2002: 8)—a situation also characterized as “believing without belonging” 
(Davie, 2000: 6).
Two indicators can shed some light on these conjectures: praying and 
subjective assessment of religiosity. Praying is a form of religious behaviour 
that does not rely on an organizational context and it is not confined to the 
Christian tradition. Even more general is the question of the degree of religi­
osity. Because the question wording does not define or confine the type of 
religiosity, everyone can answer the question with respect to their own under­
standing of this term. As a result both indicators, praying and self assessment 
of religiosity, are capable of capturing all forms of religiosity including highly 
individualized or syncretistic forms.
In Figure 4 the proportion of respondents saying they never pray is given 
for different birth cohorts. In both East and West Germany this proportion 
steadily increases and reaches approximately a third of West Germany’s and
© 2008 Social Compass. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
Wolf: How Secularized is Germany? Cohort and Comparative Perspectives 117
1919 1932 1945 1959 1972 
FIGURE 4
Proportion who say they never pray by birth cohort in West and East Germany
Data source: ALLBUS, 1991, 1994.
over 80 per cent of East Germany’s younger cohorts. Taken together that 
means that over 40 per cent of Germans bom  after the Second World W ar 
never engage in this activity.
A similar picture can be found in Figure 5. Here the development between 
the years 1982 and 2002 of the proportion saying they are not religious is 
depicted. Over time this proportion declines slightly within each cohort; 
thus there is an ageing effect. The striking finding, however, is the clear 
difference between the cohorts, with each successive cohort describing itself 
as less religious than the one before it. Given that the term “religious” was 
deliberately not further specified in the item wording, i.e. respondents 
could interpret the term as they wished, the result strongly implies that a 
majority of East Germans and a sizable minority of West Germans are not 
religious in any way.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the decline of 
traditional church-related religion is not counterbalanced by an increase in 
less traditional, more individualized forms of religiosity. Second, among 
each cohort, but especially among the younger and the East German cohorts, 
the proportion of non-religious individuals is so high that the assumption 
that religiosity is a universal human need does not seem to be warranted. 
Third, there is no indication that the decline of religiosity, i.e. the process 
of secularization, will be reversed in the near future. That is to say, if 
people have not learned to be religious, have not learned to pray, have not 
learned to turn to religion for comfort, companionship, etc. they are unlikely 
to do so in the future.
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FIGURES
Proportion saying they are not religious by birth cohort in West and East Germany“
a Values 1-3 on a 10-point scale.
Data source: ALLBUS 1982, 1992, 2002.
3.3 The relationship between church-related and individual religiosity
In the preceding sections church-related or traditional religiosity and indi­
vidual religiosity have been treated separately. From  the results that were 
presented so far, but also from common wisdom, it can be safely assumed 
that the two forms of religiosity are related. Those who belong to a religious 
group and go to church will perceive themselves as religious. As Figure 6 
demonstrates, this assumption is clearly confirmed by the data. The more 
often respondents report going to church, the higher they score on self­
assessed religiosity. If we look at the different cohorts, two points are note­
worthy. First, the more often people go to church, the less do they differ 
with respect to individual religiosity. Or put differently, cohort membership 
begins to play a role the less often one goes to church. Especially among those 
never going to church, a sizable group claims to be at least somewhat 
religious. A t first sight this result fits well into the claim that many who 
turn away from traditional religiosity do not give up their religiosity. Here, 
however, the second remarkable finding concerning the cohorts comes into 
play. If we look closely, it is the older cohorts showing a certain degree of 
incongruity between church attendance (traditional church-related religios­
ity) and their self-assessed religiosity. In addition it can be shown that 
almost all of them are members of religious organizations. The compara­
tively low attendance rate of the oldest cohort, then, is most probably related 
to health problems. In contrast, the younger, those who should theoretically 
be most interested in and explore “alternative” forms of religion, are the
© 2008 Social Compass. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
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FIGURE 6
Mean subjective religiosity by church attendance and birth cohort in Germany
Data source: ALLBUS 1982, 1992, 2000, 2002.
most congruent. If they do not attend services, they are very likely to say they 
are not religious at all.
3.4 The social consequences o f religion
While a decline of religiosity may be interpreted as signifying secularization 
such a development may lead to an increased salience of the difference 
between those who are religious and those who are not. Thus declining reli­
giosity can actually lead to an intensification of discussions around religious 
issues and an increase of the importance of this dimension in social life.8
Traditionally religiosity was linked to many attitudes, behaviours and 
social structural variables: gender roles (Volz, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 
2003), voting (Mielke, 1991), family status and fertility (McQuillan, 2004; 
Wolf, 2007), education (Peisert, 1967) and occupation (Offenbacher, 1900; 
Weber, 2002 [1930]) to name but a few. Several studies show that the empiri­
cal relationship between religiosity and these characteristics has weakened 
(Dogan, 1995; Dobbelaere, Gevers and Halman, 2003; Wolf, 1996; Schnell 
and Kohler, 1995).
There is here neither the space to present the cited studies in greater detail, 
nor the opportunity to present a thorough investigation specific to this study. 
Instead, an illustrative analysis exemplifying the general trend of decreasing 
social consequences of religion must suffice. This illustrative analysis looks at 
the relationship between religiosity and political orientation on the left-right
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scale as well as an analysis of the relationship between religiosity and post­
materialism as defined by Inglehart. Church-related religiosity is associated 
with more traditional, more conservative attitudes whereas less religious 
people are less traditional, more liberal (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 196— 
212). Therefore, it can be expected that people who are less religious signifi­
cantly more often hold postmaterialist orientations than religious people, 
and that those who are less religious tend to be more inclined to the left, 
politically speaking, than those who are more religious.
As Figure 7 shows these expectations are met. The two graphs, (a) and (b), 
give the development of the (unconditional) odds ratios for never going to 
church and having postmaterialist or left-wing political orientations. As 
can be seen, both indicators are related to the absence of traditional 
church-related religiosity in the expected way; non-attenders are more 
likely to be classified as postmaterialists and as “ leftists” than those who 
at least visit religious services from time to time. However, the strength of 
these relationships has declined during the last quarter of a century in West 
Germany. While the odds ratios were between 2.5 and 3 in the 1980s, they 
fell to just 1.5 by the middle of the 1990s. Thus, the social consequences of 
going to church have clearly declined in West Germany. The data for East 
Germany, which are only available from 1991, show a weak relationship 
between church attendance and postmaterialism or left-wing orientation 
that is generally lower than in the West.
Taken together with other findings of the decreasing importance of 
religiosity for various domains cited above, it can safely be concluded that 
religiosity has greatly lost its significance for those areas of life not directly 
related to religion. Therefore we can indeed assert that Germany is more 
secularized today than 25 years ago.
a) postmaterialist orientation b) left-wing political orientation
FIGURE 7
Relationship between never going to church and two attitudes in West Germany 1980-2006, 
odds-ratio and 95% confidence interval
Data source: ALLBUS 1980-2006.
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3.5 The international perspective
In this last empirical section we will put the German situation into an inter­
national perspective. Suitable data are provided by the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) from 1991 and 1998. Because the ISSP has 
rather small samples in some countries, this study uses a combined dataset 
including information on 13 or, if East and West Germany are treated 
separately, 14 countries.9 Although all these countries are dominated by 
Christians, they reflect different political histories and religious traditions. 
The study will draw on the same four indicators used for the analysis of 
the development in Germany: church membership, church attendance, pray­
ing and subjective assessment of religiosity. As was argued above, the first 
two of these are interpreted as indicators of church-related religiosity while 
the latter two are seen as indicators of individual religiosity. When the 
mean values of both indicators for each country are plotted against each 
other, we obtain the scatter plot given in Figure 8.10
A bsence  o f church-re la ted  re lig iosity 
FIGURE 8
Relationship between church-related religiosity and individual religiosity in 14 countries
Data source: ISSP 1991, 1998.
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The lower left hand com er in this chart indicates a population in which 
nearly everyone belongs to a religious group, goes to church, prays at least 
sometimes and describes themselves as at least somewhat religious. Empiri­
cally, Poland and Ireland can be found near this extreme point. The more 
one moves away from this com er towards the opposing com er of the 
chart, the higher the proportion of the population that is religious neither 
in a church-related nor in an individual way. Russia, East Germany and 
the Netherlands occupy a very similar position with respect to low levels of 
church-related religiosity. However, they differ with respect to individual 
religiosity, with the Netherlands being more religious on this dimension 
than the other two.
Interestingly, most countries are located around the bisecting line marking 
equal closeness to or distance from church-related and individual religiosity. 
Thus in most countries a decline in church-related religiosity is accom­
panied—which comes first cannot be decided on the basis of the current 
evidence—by an equal loss in individual religiosity. Among the countries 
included in the analysis, the U K  and the Netherlands are notable exceptions. 
Here individual religiosity is much higher than would be expected on the 
basis of church-related religiosity.11 The interesting question as to why the 
Netherlands and the U K  differ from other countries in this respect must be 
more thoroughly researched and cannot be addressed here.
Compared with other countries in Europe, East Germany is extremely 
secular. Though it is far less secularized than the former GDR, West 
Germany still shows medium to high levels of secularization when compared 
to other countries.
4 The future: more secularization or religious revival?
How secularized is Germany and what are the likely developments in the 
future? Undoubtedly, East Germany is among the most secular countries 
of the world (Meulemann, 2004). The re-emergence of religion in East 
Germany that some commentators had foreseen after the breakdown of 
the G D R  has not materialized. Neither church-related religiosity nor other 
religious forms have been able to gain ground in this former socialist territory 
(Pollack, 2000). West Germany is far less secularized. A  majority of the 
population still belongs to a religious group, mostly the Catholic or a main­
line Protestant church. However, even among church members we find very 
low levels of church attendance and a rather high percentage of people leav­
ing the churches. As in East Germany, those who have left traditional 
churches behind do not seem to be drawn to alternative religious forms in 
large numbers. Finally, compared with other West European countries, 
West Germany shows medium to high levels of secularization.
The evidence presented in this paper, as well as the many results cited, can 
leave no doubt: Germans have turned away from the churches in large num­
bers and continue to do so. Furthermore, at the examination of the data from 
a cohort perspective has shown that each cohort is less religious than its 
immediate predecessor. Rather than turning to other forms of religion—or
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becoming dedicated atheists—Germans who have left the churches are 
religiously indifferent: they just do not care (Kaufmann, 1989). In addition, 
religiosity or the absence thereof is far less salient for attitudes and beha­
viours today, and thus has fewer social consequences than formerly. In this 
sense Germany is more secularized today than in the past. But will this devel­
opment continue?
Some developments may seem to counteract the general decline of religios­
ity. When the first draft of the European constitution was presented in 2003, 
a hot debate about the missing reference to God and to Europe’s Christian 
tradition began. When Pope Benedict XVI visited Germany in the year 
2005 to celebrate the 20th World Y outh Day in Cologne, over one million 
people attended the concluding mass. Of further importance are the many 
recent violent events related to religion: the terrorist attacks in the US on
11 September 2001; similar attacks in M adrid in 2004, or in London one 
year later; the murder of Theo van Gogh in the year 2004 and assaults on 
mosques across Europe. These are just a few instances that seem to show 
that religion and religious differences continue to have a huge influence on 
our lives.
Religion may continue to be salient in the (international) political arena 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2004); religious events and religious stars may 
continue to attract large crowds, especially younger people. These events, 
however, do not lead to a reversal of the declining religiosity of Germany’s 
(or Europe’s) population. On the contrary: churches have lost and continue 
to lose members, and both those remaining in the churches and those not 
belonging to a religious group have become less religious and continue on 
this path (see Turner, 2005). As Glendinning and Bruce (2006) have noted, 
those who have turned away from traditional Christian religion do not 
normally believe in anything else. Once it’s gone it’s gone.
To be sure, the picture evolving from the analysis presented here is 
incomplete and gives only a rough outline of the most im portant aspects 
of the development of religiosity in Germany. The actual picture is much 
more colourful, varied, interesting and contradictory. However all these 
aspects are framed by the processes depicted above, and judged from current 
knowledge there is no trend strong enough to turn around the general decline 
of religiosity. In other words, the trends described in this paper, and thus 
secularization, will continue (also see Bruce, 2002).
NOTES
'' An earlier version o f this article was presented at the 29th conference o f the 
International Society for the Study o f Religion which was held in Leipzig in 2007. 
For discussing this earlier version and providing many valuable suggestions, I owe 
thanks to George F. Bishop.
2' The other incongruent combination (high level o f traditional religiosity, low 
level o f individual religiosity) has not gained interest in theoretical debates. It 
might be interpreted as an orientation towards religious conventions; if  this 
occurs is an empirical question.
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3' Church membership, especially in the two large churches mentioned here, is 
clearly defined. The data presented in this section can be considered to be valid 
and highly reliable.
4' The indicator used in Figure 2 is the average number o f persons attending 
each service. If one looks only at services connected with Christmas there is actually 
an increase in church attendance from 26 per cent in 1980 to 36 per cent in 2005 
(EKD, 2006).
5' The ALLBUS was fielded for the first time in 1980 and since then every second 
year; more information on the survey can be found here: http://www.gesis.org/en/ 
data_service/allbus/index.htm.
6' Those born before 1919 were bom  in the German Empire (Deutsches Reich) 
under Wilhelm II; those born between 1919 and 1932 were bom  in the Weimar 
Republic, those born between 1933 and 1945 were born in the years o f the Nazi 
rule and the Second World War; the next cohort, bom  between 1946 and 1959, 
was born in the reconstruction period o f the immediate postwar years; those bom  
between 1960 and 1972 were bom  in a phase o f economic success, new self- 
confidence and educational expansion; the last period begins with the first oil crisis 
in 1973, at the start o f a time o f increasing economic difficulties and growing 
unemployment rates.
7' If we analyse frequent church attendance we obtain a mirror image. In West 
Germany, the older cohorts show the highest rates o f attendance (up to 40 per cent), 
while among the younger cohorts only 10 per cent to 15 per cent go to church at least 
once a month. In the East, the rates for regular attendance are below 10 per cent for 
all cohorts.
8' It is also true that a situation in which individual-level religiosity remains 
constant the salience o f religion for non-religious issues may decline.
9' Austria (AT), East Germany (DE-E), West Germany (DE-W), Hungary 
(HU), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), 
Russia (RU), Slovenia (SI), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US).
,0' The horizontal axis reflects the average o f the country-specific proportions of 
those not belonging to a religious group and those not going to church. The vertical 
axis gives the country-specific proportions o f those who never pray and those saying 
they are not religious (scale values 6 and 7 on a 7-point scale).
"• In so far Davie’s (2000: 619) dictum o f “believing without belonging” does 
not seem to be totally out o f place; although Voas and Crockett (2005) have con­
vincingly shown that the British “neither believe nor belong” .
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